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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT LEE JONES
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
CLAUDIUS D. KNUTSON and
SALT LAKE CITY LINES, a
Utah corporation
Defendants and Appellants

No. 10163

STATEMENT O·F THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of
a collision between the plaintiff driving his automobile
and the bus of defendant Salt Lake City Lines.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER CO·URT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff, defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment, and a
judgment of dismissal, or, failing that, a new trial.
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STATEMENT 0'F FACTS
The facts in this case are relatively simple and should
give rise to very little dispute. Plaintiff, Robert Lee Jones,
brought suit for injuries allegedly resulting from defendant
Knutson's operation of the bus of defendant, Salt Lake
City Lines. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Knutson negligently
drove the bus into the back end of a car being driven by
plaintiff. The accident occurred November 2, 1961, at
about four o'clock in the afternoon, while the bus was
proceeding down Ninth South Street in Salt Lake City.
The weather was clear and the street was dry (Tr. 2-3).
At the place of collision Ninth South Street has a steep
grade and consists of four traffic lanes, two running east
and two west (Tr. 3). The street is approximately 62
feet wide and the outside lane (next to the curb) is 19
feet 8 inches wide, while the inside lane is 11 feet across
(Tr. 10). The street was divided up the center by two
yellow lines about 4 inches apart (Tr. 12). According to
the investigating officer, the collision point was about 15
feet from the north curb of Ninth South Street, thus
placing it in the outside lane (Tr. 10).
Just prior to the collision, Mr. Knutson was driving
his loaded bus west on Ninth South and made a safety
stop at Twelfth East Street to check his air brakes before
proceeding down the hill immediately before him (Tr.
66). His brakes were in good order (Tr. 71). As he
started up, he observed plaintiff's automobile stopped
between the two lanes of traffic on the north of Ninth
South. The door was open and a person later identified
as the driver, Mr. Jones, was leaning out and picking up
some object from the street. The driver then closed the
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door and proceeded west down the hill, pulling slightly to
the right and continuing in the outside lane; he then made
an unexpected stop in a double parked position about half
way down the hill toward Eleventh East Street. The bus
was following plaintiff's car some 70 feet back and at a
speed between ten and twelve miles per hour. Mr. Knutson
had his foot on the air brake pedal all the way dovrn the
hill (Tr. 66, 67). As the bus and plaintiff's car proceeded
down the hill from Twelfth East, they were traveling
about the same speed (Tr. 74). The brake lights of the
Jones' auto were going on and off while it went down
the hill (Tr. 68). Marry Ferris, a passenger in the front
scat of the bus, described plaintiff's second stop as tea
sudden, unexpected stop" (Tr. 75). Plaintiff himself
testified that he gave no arm signal for this second stop
(Tr. 51). Upon observing that stop, the bus driver
sounded his horn and put on his brakes with such force
that Miss Ferris was thrown against the seat and ((school
books were thrown all over" (Tr. 75). Almost immediatelr thereafter, the collision occurred. At that time
another vehicle was passing the bus heading west in the
left lane and prevented Mr. Knutson from going around
plaintiff's car (Tr. 67). Apparently the bus, in stopping,
left no skid marks (Tr. 7). When it hit the rear end of
the Jones' car, the bus was going about two miles per
hour. It proceeded about two feet after the impact (Tr.
14, 68) . Plaintiff made his second stop as his car drew
opposite an automobile parked next to the curb. I-Ie
therefore had brought his car to a stop in the traveled
portion of the outside lane of traffic, then being used
by the bus (Tr. 25, 27, 76).
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4
The events surrounding plaintiff's operation of the
car at the time of the accident were detailed in plaintiff's
testimony and that of his passenger, Gayle Meier. Mr.
Jones happened to be following a woman's car west down
9th South Street in the right hand lane of traffic when
he saw some object fall from the top of her car. That
was just below Twelfth East Street and at the time he
was quite a ways behind her car. The lady driver stopped
on the side of the road, alighted from her car and picked
up an object from the street. Upon that occurrence, Jones
gave an arm stop signal, stopped his car about one and
one-half feet over the white line dividing the two west
bound lanes of Ninth South Street, opened his left door
and while sitting in the driver's seat, stooped down and
retrieved the lady's shoe (Tr. 24). Jones then drove what
he estimated as about fifty feet further down the hill,
to a point alongside the lady's parked car, where his
passenger friend, Mr. Meier, ccreached across and handed
her the shoe" (Tr. 25, 26.) Mr. Meir's recollection was
that Mr. Jones first and second stops were a fifth of a
block or less apart (Tr. 17).
About a minute to a minute and a half elapsed between Jones' first stop and the time the vehicles hit
(Tr. 17). The shortness of the second stop is well indicated
by Mr. Meier's testimony that he ccwas in the act of handing them to (the lady) Miss Warner who was in the
parking lane, the extreme right area shown in the diagram,
when the bus hit us in the rear ... " (Tr. 16). Jones held
his foot on the brake pedal all the way down the hill and
while stopped to deliver the shoe (Tr. 25, 26). Jones
never saw the bus at any time prior to the collision (Tr.
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:!8). Just before the impact he heard the bus horn sound

two or three times, and as he turned to look, the collision
occurred (Tr. 25). Jones testified that his car had a large
rear window and if he had looked into his rear view mirror,
he could have seen the bus following him (Tr. 49). At
the time, no cars were parked either in front or to the
rear of the lady's parked car, so that Jones could have
pulled over to the curb and stopped before delivering the
shoe to the lady (Tr. 50).
The record contains evidence that at the time of
the accident the brakes on the bus were inadequate to
stop it after Mr. Knutson saw the Jones car make the
last stop. Miss Ferris testified that the bus driver put on
the brakes when Jones stopped, and ((the bus was stopping
but it couldn't stop in time. He hit the car" (Tr. 75).
Mr. Knutson, just after the accident, told the investigating
officer that he had ((put on the brakes all the way as
hard as they would go. It seemed like the bus wouldn't
stop. The brakes wouldn't slide the wheels or stop it"
(Tr.4).

ARGUl\ffiNT
POINT I.
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT NO~TWITH
STANDING THE VERDICT, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF
WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE DAMAGE SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF.
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(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIO,N NO.
7 THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD BE NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO GIVE A HAND
SIGNAL PRIO·R TO HIS STOPPING.
Appellants here contend that plaintiff's conduct as
he proceeded down 9th South Street just before and up
until the collision with the bus, constitutes contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Plaintiff testified that he gave no arm or hand signal for his second stop on 9th South Street (Tr. 51).
Under the circumstances existing just prior to the accident, the flashing of the brake lights of the Jones car
moving down the hill was not a legally sufficient notice
that Mr. Jones was going to stop in the lane of traffic,
double parked. The normal procedure for a driver traveling down a grade such as 9th South Street is to apply
the brakes intermittently until the car reaches the bottom of the hill.
The applicable Utah statutes provide:
1953)

(U.C.A.

41-6-69 (c) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first
giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give
such signal.
41-6-70 Signals-Method of giving-Signal lamps.-(a) The signals herein ·required shall
be given either by means of the hand and arm or by
a signal of a type approved by the state road commission, ::· ::- *
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41-6-103. Stopping, standing or parkingProhibition as to specified places. (a) No person
shall stop, stand or park a vehicle, except when
necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or
in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or traffic-control device, in any of the
following places:
( 12) On the roadway side of any vehicle
stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street.
When the facts of this case are closely examined, it
becomes evident that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence on two counts: failure to give a proper stop
signal, and stopping in the lane of traffic being used by
the bus. Each of these neglectful acts contributed to the
accident and each in itself is a bar to plaintiff's recovery
against defendants.
Defendants' requested instruction No. 7, refused by
the trial court, correctly states the law applicable where
a driver fails to give a proper stop signal. That instruction
reads:
((You are instructed that Utah law provides
that no person shall stop or suddenly decrease the
speed of a motor vehicle without first giving an
appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to
give such signal. In this regard, the mere visible
light showing the application of the brakes is not
compliance with Utah law but the giving of an appropriate signal in this regard would require the
giving of a hand signal.
Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff in this
action stopped or suddenly decreased the speed of
his vehicle without first giving a hand signal to the
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driver of the vehicle immediately to its rear and
that the plaintiff further had an opportunity to
give such a signal, then you will f'ind that the
plaintiff was contributorily negHgent."
None of the Court's instructions contained the point
of law raised by the above instruction No. 7. Thus the
trial court withheld from the jury's. consideration a material element in the determination of plaintiff's contributory negligence, and denied defendants the right to have
their theory of the case presented to the jury on the facts
before it.
We have emminent judicial authority to support the
appellants' arguments.
The general rule, followed by the Utah Supreme
Court, is that a driver's violation of a motor vehicle statute is negligence as a matter of law. In North vs. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P. 2d 871, the Court had before it an action for injuries sustained by a minor while
riding a motor scooter. The scooter had crossed over to
the wrong side of the road just before the collision. Plaintiff was also carrying a passenger on his motor bike. The
evidence established that the defendant was turning his
car to the left in the proper lane at the time the scooter
hit the defendant's automobile. The Supreme Court upheld the Trial Court's direction of a verdict for defendant
for the ·reason that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The Court observed that
plaintiff was guilty of violating two Utah statutes uupon
which negligence in law may be predicated." Plaintiff
was running his scooter on the wrong side of the highway
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and was carrying a passenger contrary to the Utah law.
The Court stated:
uThese statutes were promulgated for the protection of the public and to safeguard property,
life and limb of persons using the highways from
accidents of the type here involved. Violations of
these statutes then constitute negligence in law.
This doctrine of the law has been steadfastly adhered to by this court and generally in other courts
throughout the United States."
The Court further found that plaintiff's violation of
the statutory standards of care was. a proximate contributing cause of the injury and therefore he is, ubarred
from recovery as a matter of law." The Court's definition is particularly applicable here to Mr. Jones' negligence. Quoting from Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Utah 68,
94. P 2d 1068, 1075, the Court stated:
((Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural or continued sequence, unbroken by any new,
intervening, efficient cause, produced the result
complained of, and without which the damage
would not have been sustained."
In Morbey v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231,
the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that violation
of a statutory duty resulting from the operation of an
automobile constitutes negligence a matter of law, but
made an exception for a thirteen-year-old boy who was
riding a bicycle when struck by an on-coming car. The
Court cited and approved North v. Cartwright, supra.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals passed upon the
above Utah statute on signaling for a stop, in the case of
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United States vs. First Security Bank, 208 F. 2d 424
(CA lOth, 1953). There, the plaintiff brought suit against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries sustained in an accident involving three cars, one
of which was a United States mail carrier. Vernon, a
rural route mail carrier, was delivering mail during the
day and slowed down and finally stopped to make a mail
delivery. Vernon put on his brakes, but made no hand
signal whatsoever. A truck pulling a house trailer behind Vernon, and of which he was aware, applied its brakes
in response to the brake lights of the Vernon automobile
and the house trailer swung over into the plaintiff's lane of
traffic, causing the collision with the plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff contended that the defendant~ Vernon, was the cause of the accident and was negligent in
failing to give an appropriate signal when he was stopping or decreasing the speed of his vehicle.
The Court, on page 429, stated:
t(The statute (U.C.A. 41-6-60c) required
Vernon to give an appropriate signal before stopping or suddenly decreasing his speed. No hand
signal was given. It is urged that the visible light
showing application of Vernon's brakes complied
with the statute. A fair inference to be drawn
from the testimony of Mardis and his wife is that
the brake light signal which was given by the Vernon automobile was simultaneous with its sudden
decrease in speed. Under such circumstances, the
signal was not effective and was not in compliance
with the statute which provides that an appropriate signal must be given prior to stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of a vehicle."
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The Circuit Court (208 F. 2d 429) concurred in the
trial court's finding that Vernon's negligence in so stopping was a proximate cause of the collision. The opinion
states:
((* ):- ),'- Assuming that Mardis was negligent
and that without such negligence the collision
would not have occurred, it is equally true that
without Vernon's negligence the collision would
not have occurred."
In 29 A.L.R. 2d 5, is an exhaustive annotation upon
the subject of a sudden or improperly signaled stop. While
the decisions there annotated present a diversity of opinion,
the following summary statement by the author (page
12) is significant in our case:
((The cases present little controversy as to the
existence of a duty upon the part of the operator
of a motor vehicle to first take reasonable observations to determine that the movement can be made
with safety to others, before stopping or slowing
his vehicle, and to give a proper signal or warning
of his intention where others may be affected."
As the cases in the above annotation illustrate, a distinction is made, and rightly so, between an abrupt stop
made because of an emergency and one not so caused. In
our situation, Mr. Jones' second stop, made in the lane
of traffic, was not the result of any emergency.

In the aforesaid A.L.R. discussion are a number of
decisions holding that actuating the brake lights is not a
sufficient stop signal to free the driver of the charge of
negligence. The annotation, at page 31, states the rule
thus:
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nBut the fact that the stopping car was
equipped with rear lights operating off the brakes
has been held not necessarily to relieve the driver of
negligence in stopping suddenly ahead of another
driver, even though the relevant statute provided
for the giving of stop signals by an electrical or
mechanical device."
A California decision passing upori a stop signal
statute like Utah's law is Donahue v. Mazzoli, 80 Pac. 2
743. The plaintiff's car ran into defendant's truck as the
vehicles were proceeding in the same direction at about 18
miles per hour. The plaintiff had been behind the truck
for some time prior to the collision. Defendant had
abruptly stopped his truck in the line of traffic and plaintiff had failed to stop in time to avert the rear-end collision. The accident happened in broad daylight and the
weather was clear and the streets were dry. The evidence
established that the plaintiff's car was about 16 feet back
when the defendant stopped. Defendant's truck was
equipped with a signal light ccapproved by the Department
of Motor Vehicles of California" and was in good working order. Defendant maintained not only that he had
given an arm signal but that because of the signal lamp on
his car he was not required to give a hand signal. He
relied upon the California Code which contains the identical words of the Utah statute as to approval of the signal
device by the Motor Vehicle Department.
The court ruled that the use of the signal light did
not absolve defendant from negligence. Said the court:
n* * * Under all circumstances the defendants
were bound to use ·reasonable care in the operation
of the truck. To that end they were bound to
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comply with the provisions of the law (sees. 544
and 545, supra) regarding signals. But those sections prescribe cumulative duties and do not lessen the obligations of the defendants under general law. . . . Under the common law and under
the statute ... they were bound to so operate their
truck as to abstain from injuring the person or
property of another. Furthermore, under section
505 of the Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 175, they
were inhibited from operating their truck in a
reckless manner. * * *"
A case pertinent to our fact situation in certain respects is Dunaway v. Cade (La) 39 So. 2d 148, where
the plaintiff ran his bicycle into the rear of the defendant's
car as it unexpectedly stopped in the thoroughfare. The
case does not indicate whether the statute provides for the
giving of a stop signal by a light.
The defendant driver was not faced with any emergency but voluntarily stopped his automobile without giving a hand signal. The court held, among other things,
that the use of the brake light signal did not excuse the
driver from giving the proper hand signal. The defendant
testified that he had not seen the approaching vehicle in
his rear view mirror prior to the accident. O·n that point,
the Court had this to say:
((* * * Also, Cade was negligent for if he
looked in his rear view mirror and did not see
young Dunaway, he should have seen him, and if he
did not look, he should have looked, either in the
rear view mirror or in some other manner, prior to
stopping his automobile in the lane of traffic on
the pavement without any signal except possibly
a stop light warning.
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uFor these reasons, we are of the opinion that
the judgment of the District Court in holding that
the negligence of Cade was a proximate cause of
the accident is correct."
POINT II
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN GIVING THE
]URY AN INSTRUCTION UPON THE THEO·RY OF
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
By Instruction No. 9, the Court, over the objection
of defendants, presented to the jury the doctrine of last
clear chance as follows:
INSTRUCTIO·NS NO. 9
Under ce:rtain circumstances a plaintiff is
entitled to a verdict against a defendant even
though the plaintiff be guilty of contributory
negligence. This rule of law that thus permits
a negligent plaintiff to recover judgment is known
as the doctrine of last clear chance. If you determine that the plaintiff was in fact guilty of contributory negligence, you should then consider
whether or not the doct·rine of last clear chance
is applicable to this case . The doctrine of last clear
chance is applicable only if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that each of the following six propositions is true.
1. That the plaintiff was in a position of

danger.
2. That he was by reason of inattention or
lack of proper alertness totally una.ware of the
peril that threatened him.
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3. That the defendant actually saw the plaintiff and knew of his perilous position.

4. That the defendant then realized or by
the exercise of due care should have realized that
the plaintiff was unaware of the danger to himself.
5. That at the time the defendant saw the
plaintiff and knew of the peril to him and realized
or should have realized that the plaintiff was oblivious to the danger, he then had a clear opportunity
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary
care and with his then existing ability. There must
have been an actual opportunity existing at that
moment for the defendant to avoid the accident.
Also, it must have been a fair, clear opportunity
and not just a bare possibility of doing so.
6. That the defendant then negligently failed
to avail himself of that clear opportunity and as a
proximate result the plaintiff was injured.

If you find that each of the above six propositions is true, the doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable to this case, and the plaintiff is entitled
to a verdict in his favor even though you find him
guilty of contributory negligence. If you find
that anyone of the above six propositions is not
true, the doctrine of last clear chance has no
application and cannot be invoked by the plaintiff.
Defendants took their exception to the above instruction, and raised the point again in their motion for a new
trial, which the lower Court denied. Appellants here assert
that the last clear chance doctrine has no application to
the facts of our case. Let us examine the law to be
applied in resolving this issue. In Anderson v. Bingham &
Garfield Railway Company, 117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 607,
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the Utah Supreme Court accepted the definition of the
last clear chance doctrine as adopted by the Restatement
of Torts, and quoted Section 480 thereof:

ccA plaintiff, who, by the exercise of reasonable
,,,_,.;."'vigilance could have observed the danger created
by the defendant's negligence in time to have
avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but only
if, the defendant
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the
plaintiff was inattentive and therefore
unlikely to discover his peril in time to
avoid harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the
plaintiff."
The comment on clause (c) , found under Sec. 479
is as follows=

cc (f) Antecedent lack of preparation. * * *
If the defendant, after discovering the plaintiff's
peril, does all that can reasonably be expected
of him, the fact that his efforts are defeated by
antecedent lack of preparation or a previous course
of negligent conduct is not sufficient to make him
liable. All that is required of him is that he use
carefully his then available ability. Thus, if A, a
railroad engineer, discovers a wayfarer helpless on
a highway crossing which he has entered without
taking precautions to see whether a train was
approaching, and A thereafter does all which is
then in his power to stop the train before it hits
the traveler, the traveler may not recover against
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the railroad although his position was seen in ample
time to stop the train had the brakes not been negligently permitted to be in bad condition.. So too,
if a railroad train is exceeding the statutory speed
limit in approaching a level crossing but the engineer does not see the plaintiff's helpless peril on
the crossing in time to stop the train, the fact that
the train could have stopped in the distance between the two points had it been going at the lawful speed is not enough to make the defendant
liable to the negligent plaintiff."
The facts of the above case are briefly as follows:
The plaintiff was injured in a railroad crossing accident
and alleged that the train had defective brakes in violation
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Under··· one of the
court's instructions, the jury was entitled to find that the
defendant had a last clear chance to avoid injury to the
plaintiff. A verdict of no cause of action was returned.
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the instructions
to the jury were erroneous in several particulars, thereby
clouding and confusing the issue whether the defendant
had a last clear chance. O·n appeal, the· Supreme Court of
Utah held that an instruction on last clear chance was not
applicable. The court, on page 200, stated:
uThere is a diversity of judicial opinion in this
country as to the question presented by the fact
situation of this case. Stated succinctly the question
is this: Does a precedent act of negligence on the
part of a defendant, whether it be of omission or
commission, whereby the defendant has rendered
himself powerless to avert an accident after discovering that it is impending, make the defendant
liable to a plaintiff who has through his own
negligence exposed himself to peril?"
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Justice Wolfe then concluded:
ccAfter a careful review of the cases in which
the question before us has arisen and the reasoning
employed by the courts to justify their positions,
we are firmly convinced that there is no logical or
justifiable basis why, under the facts of the instant
case, the question of last clear chance should have
been submitted to the jury. Equality in treatment
to plaintiffs and defendants demands that the doctrine of last clear chance be not invoked unless
there is evidence that with the means at hand the
defendant clearly could have avoided injury to the
plaintiff."
In reaching its conclusion in the Anderson case the
Court observed:
ecEven Missouri under its broad humanitarian
doctrine has not seen fit to hold a defendant liable
who was unable to avoid injury to a negligent
plaintiff because of the defendent's own antecedent
negligence. The humanitarian doctrine cseizes upon
the situation as it then exists~- ~- ~-. The ruling that
antecedent negligence of a defendant may be taken
into consideration in determining whether he was
negligent under the humanitarian rule would in
many cases permit an unwarranted recovery
for primary negligence (antecedent negligence)
through the elimination, under the guise of that
rule, of the defense of contributory negligence.'
State ex rei. Fleming v. Bland, supra, 15 S.W. 2d
80 1."
The Utah Court also commented that it cccannot under
the thin guise of the last clear chance doctrine compare
degrees of negligence ~:- ),'- *. A driver (of a vehicle) upon
the highway does not carry with him an canticipatory last
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clear chance obligation', ie. he need not drive so as to
create a last clear chance opportunity for others."

The above statements by Judge Wolfe are very pertinent to defendants' situation in the instant case. If Mr.
Knutson, the bus driver, was driving at an excessive speed
as he came down 9th South, or if his brakes were such that
he could not stop in the distance existing between him and
the plaintiff's car when Jones made the final stop, such a
circumstance, whether negligence or not, does not carry
over to the time when the peril arose, ie, when Mr. Jones
made his second stop.
Later Utah decisions have closely analyzed the doctrine
of last clear chance. A review of those Supreme Court
cases shows there is no legal justification for applying that
doctrine to the facts of the present case.
In Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 23 5
P.2d 515, 120 Utah 453, the decedent, represented by
plaintiff, was struck and killed by defendant's engine
while she was walking along the tracks in the 0 gden yards
during the daylight hours. She was using a path which had
been availed of by employees of various companies for
some time. The evidence indicated that the engine was
proceeding about 10 miles per hour and stopped within
SO feet after striking decedent who was walking with her
hack to the engine. The train gave no audible signal and
none of the train crew was in a position to observe ahead
on the side of the track the decedent was then using. The
plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing the case,
and one ground was the lower court's failure to submit
to the jury the question of last clear chance.
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After deciding that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the Court proceeded to discuss the last clear chance doctrine and particularly Sections 479 and 48 0 of the Restatement of
Torts, Vol II. The Court correctly concluded that Section 479 applies to the situation where the plaintiff is in
a position of ((inextricable peril" and therefore the defendant alone has the last clear chance to avert the accident.
Section 479 provides that the negligent plaintiff may
recover ((if, immediately preceding the harm, (a) the
plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance and care ~- * ::- ". The Court stated that the rule
of Section 479 is applicable ((only if the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest and plaintiff is thereafter unable
by the exercise of reasonable care to avoid the injury herself". The decision then held that decedent was not in a
situation covered by that Section. Two of the Court's
illustrations of inextricable peril show the difference between that situation and our set of facts. In one case the
boy was lying on the railroad tracks either asleep or unconscious. In the other example, the decedent had been
injured and was lying between the tracks unable to escape
when the train passed over him. The Court made this
pertinent observation: ((we have never held that a mere
continuance of the same inattentive negligence created a
situation of inextricable peril. ::- * ::-"

Hit follows, thus, that the doctrine of last
clear chance does not include cases in which a plaintiff has the physical and mental ability to avoid the
risk up to the moment of the harm. His (continuing' negligence, as it is sometimes called, continues
to insulate the defendant's negligence, and the or-
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dinary rule of contributory negligence governs the
,
case.
The Compton case then proceeded to review with
approval Section 480 of the said Restatement of Torts,
quoted c~ulier in this brief. The Court stated that plaintiff may recover under that section from a defendant who
knows of plaintiff's situation and realizes, or has reason
to realize, that plaintiff is inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid harm, and defendants thereafter is negligent in failing to use ordinary care with the
means at his disposal to avoid harming him. For plaintiff
to recover under the facts before the Court in the Compton case, it would be necessary, stated the Court, that
plaintiff first prove defendant knew the decedent was in
a position of peril. The Court ruled that defendant did
not know of decedent's peril, and affirmed the lower
Court's judgment in favor of defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Thompson, 254
P. 2d 1047, 123 Utah 81, had under consideration a suit
for wrongful death of a pedestrian struck by defendant's
automobile while crossing the street. The accident occurred at night on a poorly lighted highway and the evidence showed that the deceased was walking into the path
of the car when hit. While the facts are not in line with
the situation of our present case, the law announced by
the Court is a guide in applying the last clear chance doctrine. The trial court had directed a verdict for defendant
because decedent was found to be contributorily negligent
as a matter of law. The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's refusal to submit the case to the jury on a theory
of last clear chance. Defendant in that case saw what
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appeared to be a shadow, step into the street directly into
the lights of defendant's car. D·efendant swerved his car
sharply in an attempt to avoid the decedent. The testimony was that defendant was traveling about 35 miles an
hour at the time. In holding that the last clear chance
doctrine did not apply to the facts in the case the Court
stated:
((The evidence must be such as would in all
probability reasonably support a finding that there
was a fair and clear opportunity, in the exercise of
reasonable care, to avoid the injury. It would not
be sufficient that it appear from hindsight that by
some possible measure the defendant by the (skin of
his teeth' could have avoided the injury. See A1orby
v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231."
The Court followed the language of the Conzpton case,
supra, in these words:
((Thus the matter was properly withheld from
the jury if the evidence taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b)
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff was
inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in
time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant was
thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability
to avoid harming decedent."
The Court applied statistics obtained from a publication of the Utah State Highway Patrol and determined
that in view of the distance the defendant first noticed
the decedent, which varied up to 57 feet, ((it seems clear
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that defendant could not have avoided the impact by the
application of his brakes".
((The brakes were applied. A reasonable mind
could not conclude that defendant was negligent in
failing to utilize his then existing ability to avoid
harming decedent, if he had any such ability. It
was as reasonable, if not more reasonable to turn
left as to turn right. Defendant seemingly did all
in his power to avoid harming decedent. Certainly
there is no evidence that defendant had a last clear
chance to avoid harming decedent."
Another Utah decision which supports appellant's
position here that the last clear chance doctrine should
not be applied, is Charvoz v. Cotrell, 12 Ut. 2d 25, 361
P.2d 516. There, the decedent was struck by defendant's
automobile at the time decedent was proceeding at night
in the crosswalk at the intersection of 17th South and 19th
East Streets, in Salt Lake City. The weather was dear
and the road was dry. The lower court's verdict was for
defendant and the trial court denied a motion for a new
trial. The Supreme Court ruled that the last clear chance
doctrine has no application to the facts of the case.
Appellant contended that defendant ((could have avoided
the accident by either sounding the horn of the automobile
or swerving to the right." His argument was that the
case fell directly within the provisions of the aforesaid
Section 480, Restatement of Torts. The uncontradicted
testimony established that defendant was traveling at about
_\0 miles per hour when he first saw the pedestrian's situation some 60 to 65 feet ahead of him. Defendant did not
blow his horn or tum aside but did immediately apply his
brakes. His car took about two seconds to cover the dis-
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tance from where he first observed decedent to the point
of impact. Reviewing this testimony, the Supreme Court
commented:

((It is possible that the decedent could have
extricated himself from his peril if warned by the
sound of a horn, and it is possible that the defendant could have avoided the accident had he swerved
to the right. However, the doctrine of last clear
chance contemplates a last clear chance, not a last
possible chance. The doctrine implies thought,
appreciation, mental direction and the lapse of
sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse
to save another from injury."
Except for the fact in the present case that Mr. Jones
was in an automobile instead of standing in the path of the
bus, our fact situation is quite similar to that of the Charvoz case. From the testimony of ~Aiss Ferris, the bus
passenger, and the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Knutson, the bus driver, it appears that he was going between
1 0 and 12 miles per hour when Jones made the second
((sudden, unexpected stop", and that the bus was then
about four car lengths back, that is, 70 feet or less. We
therefore may safely conclude that the bus required up to
four seconds to cover the distance from where Knutson
saw the plaintiff's second stop to the point of the collision.
We have the well established fact that the bus hit the Jones
car almost immediately after the sounding of the horn and
while the car passenger, Meier, was handing the shoe across
to the lady in the parked car. Those facts establish that
the bus driver did not have the clear chance or the time
for appreciation and mental direction required in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Charvoz case, supra. As
that decision aptly phrased the point:
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((It would not be sufficient that it appear from
hindsight that by some possible measure the defendant by the «skin of his teeth' could have avoided
the injury."

It must be noted and kept in mind at all times that
the doctrine of last clear chance, as enunciated in the above
quoted Restatement of Torts and by the Courts, is based
on the major premise that the plaintiff is in a position
of danger. Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Volume 4, Part 2, Section 2803, states the general
rule to be ((that, in order to invoke the last clear chance
doctrine, the injured person seeking its benefit must have
been in obvious and imminent peril." Now, in our case,
plaintiff's uperil" did not arise, if at all, until he had made
his second stop; and, as heretofore indicated, Mr. Knutson,
the bus driver, then had no clear opportunity or chance
as those terms are defined by the law, to avert the collision.
His situation at that time was made more difficult because
his way to the right of the Jones' automobile was, blocked
by the parked car and his way to the left was foreclosed by
the passing westbound car.
Furthermore, plaintiff's negligence continued up until the time of the impact, just as decedent's negligence
did in the Utah case of Compton v. Ogden Union Railway,
supra, where the train overtook decedent as she walked
along the track.
As this Court observed in Anderson v. Bingham &
Garfield Railway Co., supra;
ccThe doctrine of last clear chance is a limitation on the defense of contributory negligence; the
doctrine should not be extended further in its
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application than it can be supported by cogent
reasoning.''
The low·er court's Instruction No. 9 lists as one of
the requirements of the doctrine of last clear chance, a
jury finding that ((plaintiff was in a position of danger."
Because the instruction is indefinite, we cannot determine with any certainty what position of plaintiff the
court intended to cover. But regardless of the wording of
the instruction, the court committed reversible error in
giving it.
Viewing the evidence most favorably for respondent,
it establishes at most that Mr. Jones was· not in a position
of peril until he made his second, final stop prior to the
collision. That stop occurred in the lane of traffic ahead
of the bus, beside a parked car, and without any arm signal
from the driver. When that unexpected situation abruptly
confronted Mr. Knutson, the bus driver, he had no fair
and clear opportunity to avoid the accident. Mr. Jones
himself, up until the last moment, had as good an opportunity as did Mr. Knutson to avoid it. From the time the
defendant realized, or should have realized the plaintiff's
position of peril, the defendant did all that reasonably
could be required of him to avoid harming the plaintiff;
the burden was on the plaintiff to prove otherwise and
that, he failed to do.

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that the facts and the
law of this case establish that plaintiff was guilty of contributing negligence as a matter of law, and that appellants are entitled to a judgment of reversal, and dismissal
of plaintiff's suit.
Appellants also urge that the trial court's refusal to
give defendants' requested instruction No. 7 (on plaintiff's failure to give a hand signal) constitutes reversible
error.
Appellants further submit that the lower court's instruction No. 9 containing the last clear chance doctrine
also constitutes error and in itself justifies a reversal and
a new trial for appdlants.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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